How did the members of President George W. Bush’s foreign policy team rise to power? What events shaped their policy viewpoints and political worldviews? James Mann, in The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, seeks to answer those questions. He describes the careers of the six top “Vulcans”—officials who worked in the foreign policy apparatuses of past Republican presidents and returned under the latest Bush: Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and Condoleezza Rice. Mann uses the experiences of these six Vulcans as microcosms for the entire generation of neoconservatives whom the Cold War shaped and who exerted influence before and after the fall of the Soviet Union.
What set the Vulcans apart from previous generations of foreign policy gurus, such as the “Wise Men” who devised containment and the “Best and Brightest” who stumbled through the 1960’s, was their emphasis on American military power. That the generations of foreign policy officials should differ in this regard makes sense, considering their respective backgrounds. The Wise Men were businessmen, bankers, and lawyers; naturally, to prosecute foreign policy, they would rely on economics and institutions, the tools of business and legal professionals. Later, the Best and Brightest, who hailed from Ivy League academia, would, through a combination of elitist disrespect for the military and lack of real-world experience, bollocks up the Bay of Pigs invasion and the defense of South Vietnam. Finally, in the latter stages of the Cold War, the Vulcans experienced foreign policy through the prism of the Defense Department. At one time or another, Rumsfeld and Cheney served as defense secretaries; Wolfowitz was an undersecretary of defense; Rice worked for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Powell chaired the JCS; and Armitage worked as an assistant defense secretary. Also, Powell and Armitage had even served as military officers. Of course, Powell still was one, as the JCS Chairman. That the Vulcans would perceive military power as what ought to be the primary tool of American foreign policy should be little surprise, then. The military was what these people knew.
As advocates of solving America’s problems through military might, some of the people who would later become identified with neoconservatism, early in their careers, opposed détente with the Soviet Union. They did not share foreign policy virtuoso Henry Kissinger’s belief American power was on the wane, so the United States should seek accommodation with the Soviet Union. Firstly, the budding neoconservatives did not trust the Soviet Union to honor the terms and spirit of détente. Secondly, the future Vulcans did not believe American power was ebbing. They thought the United States was the most powerful country in the world, and as such, need not reach accommodations with anyone else. To counter the Soviets, the Vulcans advocated buttressing America’s dominant international position with a military buildup, restoring and surpassing the might and prestige the American military had before Vietnam.
For this goal, the Vulcans struggled against Kissinger in the administrations of President Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, slowly eroding Kissinger’s influence as the years passed. The election of Democratic President Jimmy Carter placed this battle between Republican moderates and hawks into stasis, but the subsequent Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan saw victory for the anti-détente forces. Kissinger and his policies of accommodation were out. The future Vulcans, including neoconservatives who had been Democrats but defected to the Republicans because they considered Carter weak on Communism, were in.
The 1980’s saw the neoconservative ideas put into practice: Reagan massively increased the American military budget. At first, the Reagan administration displayed no interest in reaching deals with the Soviets. Indeed, Reagan dismissed the USSR as an “Evil Empire.” Reagan might have seemed to betray the neoconservatives when he negotiated with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, but Reagan did not soften his rhetoric about the Soviet Union. In addition, Reagan did not proceed from an assumption the United States was weakening and so needed to reach an accord with the Soviets. Instead, Reagan dealt with Gorbachev from a position of strength, given to him by a preeminent American military. One could say Reagan followed neoconservatism to a natural end by seeking a just peace with the Soviet Union on American terms, an endeavor partially enabled by America’s colossal military strength.
After the Cold War, the United States found itself the one superpower in the world. The Vulcans wanted to ensure the permanency of America’s supreme worldwide influence. They believed the United States should not downsize its military, in order to cash in on a post-Cold War “peace dividend,” but enhance its military strength and expand its military capabilities so much, no other group of nations could hope to match the American military. Any such enterprise would not be affordable or feasible for foreign nations or alliances. With its unchallengeable military domination, the United States would always be able to ensure its ideas held sway in the international realm. And it would not have to cooperate or compromise with anyone. The United States could unilaterally prosecute its foreign policy objectives. This neoconservative strategy for Pax America evoked condemnation from the American left when it became public, but the Democratic administration of President William J. Clinton did not substantially deviate from the course the neoconservatives had set for the post-Cold War United States.
With the current Republican administration of President George W. Bush, the Vulcans are back in power (excepting Powell and Armitage, who left office after Bush’s first term). In the War on Terror, the neoconservatives have profoundly impacted American foreign policy, using the war as a test bed for their Pax Americana stratagem of using the military to solve the nation’s foreign policy difficulties, without recognizing constraints other international actors have sought to place on us. The United States has refused to negotiate with governments it views as enemies in the War on Terror. Americans have just issued demands, such as surrender Osama bin Laden or cooperate with United Nations weapons inspectors, after which the American military attacked countries that did not comply. In the process, the United States has eschewed the military aid of its allies, such as NATO. The United States went so far as to shrug off international opposition to the war in Iraq.
I believe The Rise of the Vulcans superbly explains how the Vulcans wedded themselves to neoconservatism. Readers get to know much about the Vulcans whom James Mann describes, as well as the neoconservative philosophy of foreign policy. This allows readers to understand better why the Bush foreign policy advisers behave as they do. Thankfully, Mann’s swift and cogent prose makes achieving this understanding easy and fun. If Mann were a historian or political scientist, excess verbiage and ponderous explanation likely would have made reading The Rise of the Vulcans a chore. But Mann’s writing benefits from his experience as a journalist, I think, which would have taught Mann to craft his writing for maximum readability.
The neoconservative ideology Mann describes scares me, to be honest. While I agree with the neoconservative strategy against the determined foe that was the Soviet Union, I oppose their vision for a post-Cold War Pax Americana, a.k.a. an American Empire. To any who would object to that characterize, I ask, how else could one label a country that uses its military to achieve foreign policy results, while concurrently aiming for supremacy over the international system and striving to ignore the preferences of other countries? That is not the United States of which the Founding Fathers conceived in 1776 and 1789.
Do not misunderstand me: Even today, I support a powerful military. I am not a dove; I even thought the idea, at least, of invading Iraq and toppling the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was appropriate. But I must oppose as “imperial” efforts to use the military to impose Pax Americana on the world and to act without consideration of our allies or the international institutions we helped forge after World War II.
Bibliography
Mann, James. The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Penguin Books, 2004.
About the Author
I'm Jason Vines, a web developer at a research institution in Washington, DC. I graduated from George Washington University with a bachelor's degree in political science, with a minor in journalism. I enjoy philosophy and web scripting, as well as reading, writing, history, video games, travel, and photography.
